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Abstract: High-skilled immigrants are a very important component of U.S. innovation 
and entrepreneurship. Immigrants account for roughly a quarter of U.S. workers in these fields, 
and they have a similar contribution in terms of output measures like patents or firm starts. This 
contribution  has  been  rapidly  growing  over  the  last  three  decades.  In  terms  of  quality,  the 
average skilled immigrant appears to be better trained to work in these fields, but conditional on 
educational attainment of comparable quality to natives. The exception to this is that immigrants 
have a disproportionate impact among the very highest achievers (e.g., Nobel Prize winners). 
Studies regarding the impact of immigrants on natives tend to find limited consequences in the 
short-run, while the results in the long-run are more varied and much less certain. Immigrants in 
the United States  aid business and technology  exchanges with their home countries, but the 
overall effect that the migration has on the home country remains unclear. We know very little 
about return migration of workers engaged in innovation and entrepreneurship, except that it is 
rapidly growing in importance. 
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1. Introduction 
The global migration of talented workers is a big topic, with lots of policy interest and a 
growing number of academic studies providing insights into its economic consequences (e.g., 
Freeman 2006, Clemens 2011). But all things considered, the topic is vastly under-studied 
compared to its economic importance. To give a sense of this gap, we review below fewer than 
50 academic articles that touch upon the link of immigration and innovation in the United States, 
even with very broad definitions, while noting that immigrants account for approximately a 
quarter of U.S. inventors. This mismatch in importance is striking, and it leaves the field and 
policy discussions anchored around policy briefs and opinion pieces from sources that frequently 
have biased agendas. Consider also a comparison against venture capital (VC) investments. VC 
investments impacted fewer patents than immigrant inventors over the last three decades, but the 
academic literature regarding VC is orders of magnitude larger.  
Moreover, a better and accurate understanding of these topics is of immediate policy 
importance. The H-1B visa program, which is described in more detail in the appendix, is a 
primary entry route for high-skilled immigrants to the United States for employment-based visas. 
The U.S. government began receiving requests for H-1B visas for fiscal year 2014 on April 1, 
2013, and the available quota for the full fiscal year was exceeded during the first week. Many 
advocates of higher rates of high-skilled immigration use the phrase ―national suicide‖ to 
describe this situation and the limited admissions of high-skilled workers compared to low-
skilled immigrants. On the other hand, expansions of admissions are passionately opposed by 
critics who believe that skilled immigration is already too high.  
We review in this paper academic work regarding the effects of global migration on 
innovation and entrepreneurship. Some studies draw directly upon these outcome variables—
such as patenting rates or firm starts—while others consider employment and wages in related 
Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields and occupations. This 
review focuses exclusively on the United States’ experience. In large part, this focus simply 
reflects where much of the work has been undertaken, and that the review attempts to cover 
multiple aspects of this phenomenon in relatively limited space. But this choice also reflects the 3 
 
comparative advantages of the author. The discussion attempts to highlight, at several points, the 
extent to which we can expect the discussed U.S. results to generalize to other settings.
1 
The first set of work considers descriptive traits about the phenomena. An 
uncontroversial fact from this discussion is that the ―quantity‖ aspect of immigration to the 
United States with respect to innovation and entrepreneurship is substantial, especially in STEM 
fields. More debate emerges about the ―quality‖ aspect. Studies take a range of perspectives, for 
example noting the disproportionate share of immigrants among U.S. Nobel Prize winners to the 
comparability of immigrants on patent citation counts. Recent work stresses the quality of 
foreign students in U.S. universities for STEM fields. We conclude that most immigrants 
engaged in STEM fields in the United States are better trained for this work than natives, but that 
they are comparable to each other conditional on education choices, with some greater potential 
for the long tail of superstars. 
The second set of work considers the aggregate consequences of higher immigration to 
the United States for innovation. As a required stepping stone, this work also considers the 
employment consequences for native workers in STEM fields due to higher immigration. We 
further discuss entrepreneurship, but this has been less studied, excepting some descriptive 
statistics. The variation in research findings becomes even larger in this context compared to the 
quality dimension discussed above. Looking across the studies, we conclude that immigration is 
associated with higher levels of innovation for the United States and that the short-run 
consequences for natives are minimal. We also conclude, however, that this aggregate 
achievement involves some displacement of U.S. workers, and the long-run impact is less 
understood. The more important thrust of this review is that we are just beginning to trace out 
and quantify how the economy reacts to immigration. Most work thus far has followed a set of 
empirical techniques developed for analyzing immigration more broadly, and recent work 
emphasizes how the economics of high-skilled migration may be different. We describe 
promising avenues currently being explored and the attractive paths that lie ahead.  
                                                 
1 Peri (2009) and Kuptsch and Pang (2006) discuss high-skilled immigration across a broader set of 
countries, and Bosetti et al. (2013) and Ozgen et al. (2011) provide recent empirical evidence from Europe. Several 
papers within this volume (e.g., Miguelez and Fink 2013, Özden and Parsons 2013, Lissoni 2013) discuss 
measurements of high-skilled immigration flows globally. 4 
 
The third set of work turns the focus outward, reviewing some basic work on how high-
skilled immigrants in the United States shape economic exchanges with their home countries. 
This discussion is fairly brief given that others are discussing these issues in this volume. At this 
point, it seems clear that high-skilled immigrants promote knowledge flows and foreign direct 
investments to their home countries, but it is unclear whether this benefit fully compensates the 
country for the potential negative consequences from the talent migration (e.g., Agrawal 2013). 
We likewise discuss return migration, but this is a second area where we know far less than we 
need to. 
This line of work sits at the intersection of many fields. A large literature, surveyed by 
Docquier and Rapoport (2012), explores the multi-faceted consequences of the global migration 
of talented workers. Terms like ―brain drain,‖ ―brain gain,‖ etc., abound, and these net effects 
require consideration of many issues such as the presence of role models, the incentive 
consequences for human capital development, and similar.  Innovation and entrepreneurship hold 
a special place in these discussions for multiple reasons, including their important link to long-
run economic growth, the plausible claim that frontier economies provide talented migrants the 
best environment for their work (Kahn and MacGarvie 2013), and the attractiveness of these jobs 
for the native workers in these countries. More research around these topics is essential. 
 
2. Descriptive Traits 
The immigration of skilled workers is of deep importance to the United States. We first 
discuss the quantity dimension of this contribution—the share of workers engaged in 
entrepreneurship and innovation that are of immigrant origin. We then review the work on the 
―quality‖ dimension of these immigrants compared to natives. 
 
Immigrant Contributions to US Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Quantity 
It is often said that the United States is a land of immigrants. In the 2008 Current 
Population Survey, immigrants represent 16% of the U.S. workforce with a bachelor's education. 
Immigrants, moreover, account for 29% of the growth in this workforce during the 1995-2008 
period. Exceeding these strong overall contributions, the role of immigrants within STEM fields 
is even more pronounced. In occupations closely linked to innovation and technology 5 
 
commercialization, the share of immigrants with bachelor’s educations is almost 25%. Moreover, 
Kerr and Lincoln (2010) estimate that immigrants account for a majority of the net increase in 
the U.S. STEM workforce since 1995. 
Beyond these estimates of employments within STEM occupations that can be 
determined from population surveys or economic censuses, recent efforts describe immigrant 
shares in terms of patent counts or firm starts. A natural starting point is the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) database (Hall et al. 2001), given its comprehensive coverage of 
U.S. patent activity, but the USPTO unfortunately does not collect information on the 
immigration or citizenship status of inventors. To make progress, Kerr (2007) and Kerr and 
Lincoln (2010) develop estimates of ethnic inventor contributions (i.e., those of Chinese or 
Indian ethnic heritage). This work uses ethnic name matching procedures (e.g., inventors with 
the names Gupta or Desai are more likely to be of Indian ethnicity). This approach does not 
isolate immigration status directly for multiple reasons,
2 but it does provide a very intuitive 
baseline. These papers emphasize the high degree of patenting contributions by ethnic inventors, 
its increase over time, and its particular importance for advanced technology fields. While 
Anglo-Saxon and European ethnic contributions account for 90% of total U.S. domestic patents 
in 1975, they represent about 76% in 2004. This declining share is primarily due to the 
exceptional growth over the 30 years of U.S. inventors of Chinese and Indian ethnicities, which 
increase from under 2% to 9% and 6%, respectively.
3 
Immigrant contributions can also be estimated from the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) database. This database has a narrower set of patents than the USPTO 
data, containing only those filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. The WIPO data record 
whether an inventor is a non-U.S. citizen, which is a lower bound on immigrants due to the 
                                                 
2 Some important issues include the fact that names do not separate first- from later-generation immigrants, 
that some Anglo-Saxon ethnic inventors are immigrants (e.g., from Canada or the United Kingdom), that names can 
change with marriage, and that some key surnames like Lee can overlap with multiple ethnic groups. Nevertheless, 
the cited studies show that there is a good correspondence of the ethnic name classification approach to the 
decennial Census and similar quality assurance exercises. 
3 Kerr (2010b) describes the strong spatial contribution of these ethnic inventors in cities like San Francisco 
and Boston. Borjas (2001), Kerr (2010a), and Ruiz et al. (2012) describe how immigrants aid the reallocation of 
economic activity across places, with the latter two studies being focused on high-skilled migration in particular. 6 
 
naturalization process. Using WIPO data from 2006, Wadhwa et al. (2007a,b) find that non-U.S. 
citizens account for at least one inventor on 24% of international patent applications from the 
United States. This patent-level calculation includes inventions with multiple inventors so long 
as one inventor is a non-citizen, so this estimate is an upper bound on the aggregate role of non-
citizens. Using ethnic name techniques to identify inventors of Chinese and Indian ethnic 
heritage, these authors also find strong contributions from these ethnic groups in particular.
4  
With respect to entrepreneurship, we know the contributions of immigrants are similarly 
large, although exact estimates remain more elusive. Saxenian (1999) finds that 24% of ventures 
in Silicon Valley during the 1980s and 1990s were run by Chinese or Indian bosses. In a follow-
up piece, Wadhwa et al. (2007b) find that immigrants started 25% of new high-tech companies 
with more than one million dollars in sales in 2006. Some of the survey methodologies in these 
studies have been criticized, but their results should remain roughly correct. A more important 
fact to bear in mind, similar to the above note for innovation, is that these figures are calculated 
across companies where at least one immigrant played a key role. Thus, by definition, the total 
contribution of immigrants is less than 25%. These contributions are particularly strong in high-
tech fields. In an advocacy piece, Anderson and Platzer (2006) similarly find that immigrants 
represent 25% of founders of recent public venture-backed companies in the United States. 
These studies shine the spotlight on high-growth entrepreneurship. For many, this focus 
is appropriate given the policy concern around fostering these entrepreneurs in particular. An 
example of this is the Start-Up Visa Act currently being discussed in the United States to provide 
easier admissions to immigrant entrepreneurs who are starting companies with high growth 
potential. The extensive sample selection for these studies, however, makes it harder to gauge the 
overall contributions of immigrants. Fairlee (2008) considers a broader landscape by returning to 
nationally representative survey databases like the Current Population Survey and the decennial 
Census. Fairlee finds that immigrants are about 30% more likely to start a business than non-
immigrants, and their share of current business ownership is on par with their population shares 
at 12%-13%. Equally important, Fairlee’s work describes the extensive range of immigrant 
                                                 
4 The exceptional growth in immigrants’ role discussed in this study are very difficult to interpret due to the 
large number of missing data pieces regarding nationality in early years of WIPO records. 7 
 
contributions. They play equally important roles in low- and high-skill sectors, reflective of the 
great range of immigrants admitted to the United States. 
To summarize, immigrants represent an important and growing part of the U.S. 
workforce for innovation and entrepreneurship. We do not have every estimate that we would 
like, and our available estimates all have some issues with them. Nonetheless, the various 
approaches all speak to immigrants accounting for about a quarter of the general employment 
and output in these sectors for the United States, or perhaps a little less, with this share growing 
substantially since the 1970s. These contributions are heavily skewed towards certain technology 
areas and regions of the United States. 
 
Immigrant Contributions to US Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Quality 
Beyond their quantity role, how do immigrants compare to natives on the quality 
dimension? The answer to this question appears to be much more nuanced than the quantity 
discussion, and we review the evidence in stages. We start with evidence on aggregate workforce 
quality. We then move to more specialized aspects (e.g., Nobel Prize winners) and studies of 
student quality. 
In a series of papers, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) and Hunt (2011, 2013) tackle 
some basic questions about whether immigrants are more innovative and entrepreneurial than 
natives as a whole, using a variety of representative data sources. A basic theme, most centrally 
discussed in Hunt (2011), is that immigrants who come to the United States for employment or 
study purposes have a large raw advantage over natives in terms of innovative outcomes (like 
filing a patent) and starting new companies. Hunt (2011) demonstrates, however, that choices 
around fields of study and educational attainment can explain most of these differences. This 
finding would suggest that quality differences between immigrants and natives, conditional on 
choosing to be involved in this area and pursuing it in school, are less important than the quantity 
factors described above. That is, it is not that immigrants are simply better than natives in 
STEM-related tasks in an absolute sense, but they do tend to make educational investments that 
lead them to be more involved in these areas. Interestingly, however, immigrants appear to retain 
some of their advantage for entrepreneurship, even conditional on education. In a subsequent 
piece, Hunt (2013) finds a similar nuanced theme. She argues that immigrants working in 8 
 
engineering occupations are performing better and obtaining higher wages than native 
engineers—being the ―best and brightest‖— thanks to their higher average education level. 
Among workers with an engineering degree, however, immigrants underperform natives, despite 
somewhat higher education, as they often work in occupations not commensurate with their 
education.
5 
As a second approach to estimating these quality levels, Kerr and Lincoln (2010) 
compare the patents made by different ethnicities in terms of their quality as measured by patent 
claims. They find very comparable qualities for Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic 
inventors in the United States. Results contained in an early version of the Kerr et al. (2013) 
paper suggests that this comparability extends across many metrics of patent quality (e.g., 
forward citations, originality indices, shifts in focus from prior work of the firm). 
Turning from these broad averages, an older literature considers the long-tail of the 
quality distribution. Stephan and Levin (2001) provide a well-known assessment in this regard, 
asking whether immigrants are disproportionately represented among individuals making 
exceptional STEM contributions. Across six indicators—for example, election to the National 
Academy of Sciences, the 250 most-cited authors, and authors of very highly-cited papers—they 
find very consistent evidence of immigrants being disproportionately represented. Wasmer et al. 
(2007) shows a similar disproportionate representation among immigrants in U.S. Nobel Prize 
winners. 
Placing these first two themes together, it becomes clear that immigration acts in two 
different ways for the United States. First, it provides the United States with a number of 
exceptional superstars for STEM work. Second, immigration acts through the sheer quantity of 
workers that it provides for STEM fields. These workers are often well trained for STEM roles, 
                                                 
5 A related descriptive fact is that immigrants account for almost half of the U.S. STEM workforce with 
doctorate educations, compared to a quarter at the bachelor’s level. Other studies tend to find corroborating evidence 
to the first half of the Hunt (2011) thesis about the greater qualifications of immigrants. For example, Lofstrom and 
Hayes (2011) compare H-1B workers to native STEM workers in the United States, finding them to be younger and 
more educated. See also Mithas and Lucas (2010). It is important to note that these studies compare one immigrant 
group (H-1B workers) to all natives. This may be appropriate to the extent that we are contemplating an increase in 
the H-1B program’s size. Hunt (2011) shows, however, that these types of immigrants are typically among the better 
skilled of immigrants, and thus broader depictions of immigrants versus natives may find the qualification 
differences weaker, similar to Fairlee’s work. 9 
 
but, conditional on that education, the immigrants are of a similar quality level to U.S. natives. 
The pieces are not at odds with each other, as amid a large STEM workforce of more than two 
million workers, the exceptional tail does not move the averages of the groups very much. While 
it is difficult to prove which of these channels is more important, we have the general feeling that 
the quantity aspect of high-skilled immigration is the stronger factor in terms of its potential 
impact for STEM work in the United States.  
To close, we also note a parallel set of work that considers the quantity and quality of 
immigrant student enrollments in STEM fields. This dimension is important as university and 
graduate school admissions shape, in large part, the United States’ future STEM workforce. 
Bound et al. (2009) and similar studies document how immigrants account for an exceptional 
share of STEM students, especially among graduate students, in levels that exceed those noted 
for the workforce above. Grogger and Hanson (2013) describe the selectivity of foreign-born 
STEM Ph.D. students in the United States. Studies evaluating the production of innovation 
within universities also tend to find a special role for immigrant students (e.g., Chellaraj et al. 
2008, Stephan 2010, Gurmu et al. 2010, Stuen et al. 2012, Gaule and Piacentini 2012).
6 
 
3. Impact for U.S. Employment, Wages, and Innovation 
We next discuss studies regarding the impact of high-skilled immigrants on employment, 
wages, and innovation in receiving countries. In comparison to the descriptive pieces in the prior 
section, these studies attempt to incorporate into the analysis the net impact of migration for host 
countries inclusive of native responses. These latter impacts are often termed crowding-in or 
crowding-out effects, depending upon whether native employment increases or declines as a 
consequence of the immigration. While the overall theme of this review is innovation and 
entrepreneurship outcomes, these responses are intimately tied up with employment and wages. 
Absent exceptional quality differences for immigrants—which appear bounded by the 
descriptive elements outlined above—the increase or decrease of aggregate innovation due to 
immigration depends in large part on how immigrants affect the employment of natives. 
                                                 
6 Weinberg (2011) and Hunter et al. (2009) provide recent evidence on the nature of outflows from 
countries (i.e., who sends). Docquier and Rapoport (2012) provide an extended discussion and review data sources 
regarding sending countries.  10 
 
 
Traditional Approaches to Defining Labor Markets 
Traditionally, economists have evaluated these impacts using the conceptual lens of 
competitive labor markets (i.e., standard supply and demand curves for the services of workers). 
Immigration is modeled as an adjustment in the potential supply of labor to a market, shifting the 
labor supply curve outward, ceteris paribus. Reminiscent of an introductory economics course, 
the subsequent relative movements of the supply and demand curves determine the changes in 
the overall quantity of labor employed and the equilibrium wage rate. If the demand curve is 
fixed, the expansion in labor supply would be expected to increase employment and lower the 
equilibrium wage. These simple predictions do not hold under cases where labor demand adjusts 
in response to immigration, which in large part depends upon how quickly complementary inputs 
such as capital and other labor resources adjust. Likewise, other questions exist like whether 
natives move out of the labor markets in response to immigration, thereby dampening the supply 
increase and shifting the labor supply curve back towards its original position. Dustmann et al. 
(2008) and Lewis (2013) provide concise depictions and some recent evidence. 
Researchers in high-skilled immigration have taken two main approaches for defining the 
labor market for such an analysis. A first approach, most closely following Card (2001), defines 
a labor market as a local area like a city or state. With this lens, immigrants to Chicago are 
thought to most directly impact the opportunities of natives currently living in Chicago. In the 
low-skilled immigration setting, this analysis is often done independent of occupation, with an 
explicit or implicit assumption that workers can move across occupations relatively easily. In the 
high-skilled immigration setting, especially related to innovation, occupations are more often 
seen as broadly fixed. Thus, often implicitly, the idea is to analyze the impact on native STEM 
workers in Chicago from STEM immigration to Chicago.
7  
Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) apply this framework to high-skilled immigration by 
using state-decadal variation for the United States. These authors find very large crowding-in 
                                                 
7 These studies do not capture well, if at all, the migration of workers out of the broad STEM occupation 
area. Some recent work with respect to trade and outsourcing suggest that the most hurt natives are those who must 
change occupations (e.g., Ebenstein et al. 2013). Using employer-employee data, Kerr and Kerr (2013) provide an 
initial study that describes the more difficult career transitions of native STEM workers leaving their jobs during 
periods of high rates of immigrant hiring into their former employers. 11 
 
effects, with big increases in innovation following upon immigration. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) 
consider city-level variations using annual changes in the H-1B visa program. This study finds 
more modest effects, with increases in immigration yielding increases in innovation mainly 
through the immigrants themselves. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) find very limited evidence of 
crowding-in or crowding-out effects. The differences in magnitude between these studies can be 
traced to several factors (e.g., quite different time frames, methodological choices), but they 
nonetheless point in the same direction, overall, on the impact—immigration increases aggregate 
US innovation, with stable or rising native employment and wages. Peri et al. (2013) further find 
city-level productivity increases following from H-1B program expansions in local areas that 
extensively rely on the program. 
A second approach considers labor markets to be specialized fields of study or expertise 
(e.g., Friedberg 2001). This approach relaxes the geographic definition of the labor market and 
instead focuses on narrower fields of work. Two examples of this work with respect to high-
skilled immigration include Borjas and Doran’s (2012) study of the migration of Russian 
mathematicians following the Soviet Union’s collapse and Moser et al.’s (2012) study of Jewish 
scientist expellees from Nazi Germany. These studies analyze the impacts of variations in 
immigrant inflows to the United States within sub-fields of mathematics and chemistry, 
respectively, with the assumption of national labor markets within each sub-field. Despite 
conceptually similar designs, these studies find different outcomes. Borjas and Doran (2012) find 
that native mathematicians were crowded out by the Soviet influx, while Moser et al. (2012) find 
substantial long-run patenting growth, indicative of strong crowding-in effects after the Jewish 
influx. Both of these studies have credible experimental designs, and so this difference in 
direction of results is disconcerting even allowing for natural differences across fields of study 
and time periods. One part may be that the Borjas and Doran (2012) study is set in an 
institutional environment with limited room for overall growth. In this setting, crowd-out effects 
are more likely to exist (the labor demand curve becomes almost vertical). The chemistry fields 
and longer time horizons analyzed by Moser et al. (2012) may allow for a greater response, but 
this observation is very speculative and it is hoped that greater reconciliation is made going 
forward. 12 
 
A related approach to this sub-field analysis considers native choices of majors within 
schools, at either the undergraduate or graduate school levels. STEM occupations require 
extensive training and non-trivial switching costs, which may make forward-looking native 
students sensitive to immigrant inflows into fields of study. Freeman (1971) and Ryoo and Rosen 
(2004) describe the STEM labor market in greater detail. Borjas (2005, 2006) and Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2013) empirically examine the impact of immigrant students on native choices with 
respect to STEM fields, with the latter paper providing more extensive references. Lowell and 
Salzman (2007) and related work also considers the extent to which STEM-degree holders work 
in the STEM-related fields after schooling. Of the empirical approaches taken for estimating the 
consequences of immigration for natives, these studies of academic major choices appear to be 
the most likely to find natives leaving STEM fields as a response to immigration. We are not 
aware of studies with respect to schooling that find crowding-in type effects, with the existing 
studies either finding no effects or some measure of crowding-out. 
Finally, Bound et al. (2013) provide a conceptually similar analysis by analyzing the 
employment and wage adjustments of computer scientists across two tech booms. The authors 
utilize a calibrated model instead of the empirical analysis that most studies employ in this field. 
Their results suggest that the substantial increase in immigration during the tech boom of the late 
1990s, which was much larger in magnitude compared to the 1980s boom, led to less wage 
growth than what would otherwise have occurred. This study provides one of the first integrated 
models to consider the impact of high-skilled immigration on the economy. As the results of 
these types of calibrated frameworks depend significantly upon the specified structure of the 
model, others may naturally want to adjust some ingredients of the Bound et al. (2013) 
framework. We hope that other researchers build upon this analysis and continue to pursue 
integrated frameworks, as more research on this dimension is sorely needed. 
Of these two main approaches for studying high-skilled immigration, it is hard to say 
whether one is more or less appropriate in terms of depicting the likely national response to 
higher immigration levels. Both types of studies conceptually rely on strict boundaries—
geographies or specialties—and there are plenty of reasons why both sets of assumptions may be 
weaker than researchers hope. With the massive improvements in data, however, these 13 
 
assumptions may become more empirically quantifiable (e.g., Borjas and Doran 2013), which 
would be an aid in appropriate research design.  
While this literature is quite small, studies using geographic areas appear to be more 
likely to find positive effects for natives from high-skilled immigration. While most discussions 
of the validity of local area studies for low-skilled immigration worry about the out-migration of 
natives, the opposite concern might exist for high-skilled migration. Since Alfred Marshall, 
economists have studied the clustering of firms that employ specialized workers or engage in 
knowledge-intensive activities. It is conceivable that high-skilled immigration to a city or state 
could engender greater native inflows due to agglomeration economies than what would be 
viable at a national level. Future research needs to evaluate whether relevant agglomeration 
economies are stronger or weaker at the national level. While it may initially seem clear that 
local agglomeration economies are larger, much of the current concerns over high rates of 
returnee STEM migration from the United States to countries like India and China center on a 
potential loss of U.S. technology leadership. The fear is less about losing individual scientists 
than losing a critical mass of frontier scientists, a process that would depend upon significant 
country-level agglomeration economies. Thus, we should not be too quick to assume a rank order 
of the spatial differences.
8 
A related conceptual issue pertains to applying these results to locations outside of the 
United States. Many European countries have one or a few leading cities (e.g., Helsinki, Finland) 
that are at least partially engaged in the European labor markets for STEM talent. In these cases, 
the impact of high-skilled immigration may draw elements from both the economics of 
individual cities, similar to the local area studies in the U.S. case, and the economics of national 
responses. An important avenue for future research is to consider these two dimensions 
simultaneously.  
Predicting an empirical response to high-skilled immigration outside of the United States 
is also complicated by the fact that we do not know very much about the non-linear nature of the 
                                                 
8 Recent work on historical transitions in scientific leadership, such as Waldinger (2010, 2013), may help 
shed light on these important issues. Papers from the agglomeration literature on the spatial dimension of knowledge 
flows include Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Rosenthal and Strange (2003), Arzaghi and Henderson (2008), and 
Ellison et al. (2010). 14 
 
returns-to-scale in these local technology clusters. Kerr and Lincoln (2010), for example, 
estimate that the patenting response to H-1B reforms in the top quintile of U.S. cities, in terms of 
program dependency, is about twice as strong as the second most dependent quintile. It may be 
more appropriate to benchmark potential experiences elsewhere off the second group of cities. In 
a similar manner, the estimates of Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) that drop California may be 
a better measure for the potential experiences outside of the United States.
9 
 
New Research Frontiers on the Labor Market Definitions 
We now consider several approaches to defining the labor market that show strong 
promise for future work (recognizing that most of the work and techniques reviewed to this point 
are very recent and will remain active research frontiers as well for years to come). A well-
known approach for studying the effects of general immigration, most closely associated with 
Borjas (2003), describes a national labor market among workers with similar education and 
age/experience profiles. With this lens, a 25-year-old immigrant with a bachelor's education in 
San Francisco may affect the opportunities of a 25-year-old native graduating from college in 
Chicago. Moreover, this effect may be larger than the effects of competition from older 
immigrants of a similar level of education who also live in Chicago. This approach has not been 
used for analyzing high-skilled immigration to date, in large part due to the fact that the highest 
education group in these frameworks is typically a bachelor's education or greater—a level 
which is usually taken as the starting point for defining skilled immigration. Most of the action 
and intense research inquiries have instead focused on dimensions like the substitution between 
high-school educated workers and those with some college education. 
Recent research builds more ―nesting‖ into these models. In the original study, Borjas 
(2003) allows for a single degree of substitutability across education-experience cells, with the 
implication being that a 30-year-old, college-educated worker is as distinct from a 20-year-old, 
college-educated worker as he or she is from a 50-year-old worker with a high-school diploma. 
With this assumption, the potential substitution between immigrants and natives can be analyzed 
                                                 
9 A bigger focus in Europe has been on the role of ethnic diversity for innovation (e.g., Nathan 2012, 
Parrotta et al. 2013). 15 
 
within each cell. Recent approaches relax this assumption by describing levels of substitution 
(e.g., Ottaviano and Peri 2012, Borjas et al. 2012). For example, a researcher can specify that the 
first and highest level of substitution is across educational attainments of workers, the second 
level is by worker age/experience, and the third level is by immigration status. With this 
approach, empirical work can allow the 20- and 30-year-old workers with college educations to 
more closely substitute for each other in the example above. The nesting structure that is 
imposed on the data is very important and must be determined by the researcher, ideally with a 
good dose of sensitivity analysis.  
While the nesting models are new, they may come to play an important role in the future 
study of high-skilled immigration. The nesting structure approach allows for richer analyses 
within the skilled worker groups themselves. Moreover, an attractive benefit of using this 
approach is that it requires researchers to better specify the economics of the interactions that 
they have in mind, even if they do not build a formal model. As an early example, Kerr et al. 
(2013) consider the degree of substitution that exists across age groups. Prominent advocates 
against the H-1B visa program claim that tech firms use the program to keep their workforces 
younger, in part to lower wage bills.
10 This claim is impossible to evaluate in the frameworks 
described earlier. While advocates against immigration cite the Borjas (2003) crowd-out results, 
this paper’s framework does not incorporate the types of substitution proposed to be the most 
important by many H-1B critics. 
To analyze this feature, Kerr et al. (2013) conceptually lay out a nesting scenario, 
exclusively among skilled workers with college degrees or higher, where the top-level is 
occupations, the second level is worker age/experience, and the third level is immigration status. 
The study then estimates the elasticity of substitution across age groups within each occupation 
using the Current Population Survey from 1995-2008. These estimates reveal that the elasticity 
of substitution across age groups is substantially higher in STEM-related fields than among other 
workers. STEM fields account for three of the four highest elasticities among occupations, and 
                                                 
10 Matloff (2003) proposes that the H-1B program offers firms two types of potential savings. One type of 
savings centers on the fact that a 25-year-old Indian H-1B programmer might be paid less than a 25-year-old 
American programmer. He argues that this emphasis is entirely misplaced and that the real savings to the firm come 
instead from displacing a 50-year-old American programmer whose salary has grown with time. 16 
 
are greater than those in fields like law or accounting. Higher elasticities of substitution by age 
for STEM occupations give one indication as to why older natives may experience displacement 
from young immigrants in STEM fields. In the nesting format, the results say that the age 
boundary between young immigrants and older natives may be more porous among STEM fields 
than in other occupations where a very low elasticity across age groups means that young 
immigrants effectively have the most impact on young natives in the same occupation. 
A second line of work considers movements of high-skilled natives across fields in 
response to immigration. Peri and Sparber (2011) consider the potential shift of native educated 
workers across occupations in response to immigration inflows. The authors find that immigrants 
with graduate degrees specialize in occupations demanding quantitative and analytical skills, 
while the native workers move into occupations requiring interactive and communication skills. 
When the foreign-born proportion of highly educated employment within an occupation rises, 
native employees with graduate degrees choose new occupations with less analytical and more 
communicative content. In a quite different context, Borjas et al. (2013) also consider native 
mobility across mathematical sub-fields in response to the Soviet influx. They demonstrate how 
native mathematicians shifted into fields where the Soviet mathematicians were less active 
before the influx, especially those mathematicians that were not superstars. 
These studies do not fit directly within the empirical frameworks depicted above, as they 
describe mobility across occupations or fields that the other studies typically assume is not 
happening. Nonetheless, they and the nesting structure work share a common motivation to 
advance our depictions of these impacts beyond strictly-defined labor markets. This is extremely 
important and represents the first steps of the economics of high-skilled immigration in 
establishing its own frameworks beyond those traditionally used to study broad consequences of 
immigration. For many reasons, such as the required educational and training investments for 
STEM work, high-skilled immigration research needs to continue to define its own approaches 
and techniques in order to achieve a full characterization of this phenomenon. Theoretical 
frameworks that guide these steps are in high demand. 
These new results and approaches can also be challenging to interpret. For example, the 
Peri and Sparber (2011) results can be viewed in a positive manner by describing complementary 
skills of immigrants and natives. Others, however, could interpret the results as demonstrating 17 
 
crowd-out effects from the technical fields, even if there are not adverse employment or wage 
consequences for the natives that have chosen different career paths. Developing a better 
conceptual framework to interpret these patterns may be as important as the additional empirical 
evidence. A starting point might be the literature on ―scientists paying to be scientists‖ following 
Stern (2004). It also appears that economists studying high-skilled immigration will increasingly 
encounter normative questions that go beyond measurement: for example, if the native worker 
obtains the same or higher salary moving to another field due to expanding immigration, do we 
consider this to be a crowding-out phenomenon? What if the native preferred the original field 
holding money constant?   
 
The Role of the Firm 
Kerr et al. (2013) argue that the study of high-skilled immigration needs to consider more 
deeply the role of the firm. A focus on firms represents a substantial departure from the 
conceptual lens of a competitive labor market described above, where immigration is framed as 
an exogenous potential outward shift of the labor supply curve and representative firms have 
some underlying demand for workers. From an empirical perspective as well, firms and other 
institutions that employ the immigrants are also rarely mentioned.  
This is quite striking since U.S. firms play a central role in the immigration process for 
high-skilled workers. A prime example is the H-1B visa, which is the largest program for 
temporary skilled immigration to the United States. To begin, the H-1B is a firm-sponsored visa, 
meaning that a company first identifies the worker that it wants to hire. The firm then applies to 
the U.S. government to obtain a visa and pays the associated fees on behalf of that specific 
worker. This worker can come from anywhere in the world, and while the application procedure 
does have requirements with respect to the local area in which the employee will work in the 
United States, these conditions are primarily non-equilibrium in nature. The visa has a regulated 
supply that lacks a pricing mechanism and is sometimes allocated by lottery. Finally, once the 
work has started, the immigrant is effectively tied to the firm until obtaining permanent 
residency or obtaining another temporary visa. The firm can potentially sponsor the employee for 
a green card, a process that takes six years or longer for some nationalities, during which time 
the employee is even more closely tied to the firm.  18 
 
This depiction highlights the strong role that firms play in these admissions. The structure 
of the high-skilled immigration program is designed in part to allow firms to select the workers 
that they want to hire, rather than having employment-based immigrants to the United States be 
selected by the U.S. government. Moreover, most of the arguments in the public debate about the 
impact of skilled immigration in the United States are firm-level statements.
11 Given this policy 
framework, it seems particularly valuable to understand exactly how the visas are used within the 
sponsoring firms. (It also makes a lot of sense for us to spend more time researching the 
universities that are a key source of initial immigration inflows into the economy, with the work 
noted earlier about university innovation as an important starting point.) 
The recent availability of large employer-employee datasets allows researchers to 
consider these views in greater detail, and Kerr et al. (2013) analyzes the U.S. experience using 
the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics database. The study finds that the increased 
employment of young skilled immigrants raises the overall employment of high-skilled workers 
in the firm, increases the immigrant share of these workers, and reduces the older worker share 
of skilled employees. The latter effect is evident even among natives only and connects to the 
nesting framework of age elasticities described above. The study finds that the expansion of 
young high-skilled immigrant employment does not result in significant growth of employment 
for older high-skilled workers, but the evidence also suggests that absolute declines in 
employment of this group are not likely. These estimates suggest that age is an important 
dimension on which firms make decisions and that there may be lower complementarity between 
young high-skilled immigrants and older domestic workers.   
The development of new employer-employee data offers great promise for expanding our 
understanding of the high-skilled immigration process from both empirical and theoretical 
perspectives. The literature on international trade, for example, has benefited tremendously over 
the last decade from greater consideration of the role of the firm and the heterogeneities across 
firms. It is likely that studies of high-skilled immigration can undergo a similar transformation. 
                                                 
11 For example, Bill Gates has stated in congressional testimony that Microsoft hires four additional 
employees to support each H-1B worker hired. On the other hand, Matloff (2003) and Hira (2010) criticize specific 
displacement that is occuring within firms due to the hiring of H-1B workers. Kerr et al. (2011) consider firm-level 
lobbying on behalf of high-skilled immigration. 19 
 
This is also an area where work outside of the United States is feasible and to be encouraged. For 
example, Nokia has played an enormous role in skilled immigration to Finland, and many other 
countries have similar experiences. 
 
4. Turning the Attention Outward 
We close this review with some broader thoughts about the global connections of these 
migrants. Given the other conference reports on these dimensions, this discussion is less 
comprehensive that the analyses so far, but the U.S.-specific studies help complete a perspective 
on the global migrations to the United States. 
 
The Importance of Place 
In the introduction, we briefly mentioned the plausible claim that frontier economies 
provide STEM immigrants the best environment for their work. This is important to the extent 
that technologies that immigrants produce in the United States can be shared throughout the 
world. Placing aside difficult questions about diffusion lags and intellectual property protection 
rights (e.g., Naghavi 2013, Kaboré 2013), allowing the migration of skilled talent to places 
where those skills can be best utilized provides a foundation for greater prosperity for all. This is 
true within countries, with great entrepreneurial talent flowing to Silicon Valley from many parts 
of the United States, and the same gains can happen across countries. Two recent studies provide 
an interesting perspective on these issues.  
Kahn and MacGarvie (2013) compare foreign-born U.S.-educated scientists that must 
relocate outside of the United States after their doctoral studies due to exogenous reasons related 
to their student visa restrictions, compared to their foreign-born peer students that are allowed to 
stay in the United States. In terms of publications and citation counts, Kahn and MacGarvie 
(2013) find that graduates forced to re-locate outside of the U.S. perform much worse if they 
must locate to a place with low income per capita. However, the authors also find a scientist 
exogenously located in a country at the top of the income distribution can expect to be as 
productive in research as he or she would be in the United States. These patterns accord with the 
much higher stay rates that we observe for foreign students from low income countries compared 
to places like Western Europe. 20 
 
Clemens (2013) considers international differences in workers’ wages and productivity. 
He exploits the randomized processing of U.S. H-1B visas for a group of Indian workers who 
produce software within a single multinational firm. When applications for U.S. H-1B visas 
exceed the annual cap set by the government within the first week (similar to fiscal year 2014), a 
lottery is conducted over the applications to award the limited positions. Clemens’ personnel 
records contain the winners and losers in the lottery for the multinational firm. Clemens finds 
that the winners’ salary increases six-fold upon relocating to the United States with the visa. 
Given the randomization of the lottery and the fact that the winning and denied applicants are 
doing the same kind of work for the multinational firm, Clemens argues that country-of-work by 
itself is responsible—in this industry—for roughly three-quarters of the gap in productivity 
between workers in India and workers in the richest countries.   
 
Connections to Home Countries 
These findings that immigrants are more productive in advanced economies provide 
support for beneficial effects of migration, but they stop short of saying that overseas populations 
aid their home countries. Several studies suggest home countries receive some economic benefits 
from having STEM workers in the United States. (In turn, these studies stop short of saying that 
these economic benefits offset potential negative consequences of the out-migration of talent—
this review will skip such a complicated adding-up exercise given the vastly incomplete evidence 
accumulated to date, much less our ignorance about how to weight the various factors involved.) 
Saxenian et al. (2002) provide a well-known survey of immigrant scientists and engineers 
living in Silicon Valley. These surveys, while very unrepresentative for all immigrants, offer 
some sense of the relative forms of these contributions. Saxenian documents that 82% of Chinese 
and Indian immigrant STEM workers report exchanging technical information with their 
respective nations, roughly 50% of immigrants report aiding the development of contracts or 
business relationships between the United States and their home countries, and 18% report 
investing in overseas business partnerships. Saxenian’s estimates clearly overstate the home-
country exchanges of all immigrants, given the specialized nature of her sample, but the key 
question is by how much.  21 
 
Beginning with knowledge flows, more systematic studies with patent citation data 
suggest that immigrant STEM workers in the United States can aid technology transfer to their 
home countries (e.g., Kerr 2008, Agrawal et al. 2011, Oettl and Agrawal 2008). Kerr (2008) 
emphasizes that these ethnic transmission channels are particularly powerful in the first five to 
seven years after a new technology is developed. Agrawal et al. (2011) find that the Indian 
diaspora in the United States aids its home country the most with the development of big, highly-
cited inventions, but that the diaspora is not as helpful in the production of average inventions as 
a larger domestic base of inventors. Agrawal (2013) picks up and expands upon these themes. 
Turning to other forms of business exchanges, a long literature considers the role of 
ethnic networks in trade patterns (e.g., Rauch and Trindade 2002), and Rauch (2001) and Keller 
(2004) provide important reviews of related literatures. We are not aware of any studies that have 
validated this for the United States in particular, similar to the firm-level documentation in 
Europe (e.g., Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk 2011), but it is reasonable to suspect it exists. A 
similarly long literature documents the link between ethnic networks and foreign direct 
investments (FDI) across countries (e.g., Kugler and Rapoport 2007, 2011; Kim and Park 2013). 
Foley and Kerr (2013) document this pattern with respect to ethnic inventors using firm-level 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Their analysis in particular emphasizes the role of 
ethnic inventors in the United States for helping their employers develop R&D-based work 
abroad and enter into foreign countries without the support of local joint venture partners, 
perhaps due to better knowledge of the home country. Foley and Kerr (2013) also provide a more 
extensive literature set on both the trade and FDI channels. 
Beyond trade and FDI, additional work considers the role of immigrants in the 
outsourcing of work. One way that diasporas are thought to connect with their home country is 
by facilitating the outsourcing of work (with special emphasis often given to India). It is felt, for 
example, that the U.S.-based members of an ethnic group can provide knowledge about 
opportunities to their home countries, serve as reputational intermediaries, facilitate contracts, 
and similar. Hira (2010) argues that this relationship is true (in a negative way), and moreover 
that the H-1B visa is particularly used as a vehicle for outsourcing by bringing immigrants to the 
United States for training in the jobs to be conducted overseas. There certainly appears to be 
truth to this claim, as the top three H-1B applicants in 2013 for H-1B visas were Indian 22 
 
outsourcing firms, with Infosys (#1) applying for three times more visas than Microsoft (#6). 
Beyond this high-profile approach of dedicated outsourcing firms, the relationship becomes less 
clear. Using data from oDesk, the world’s largest on-line platform for outsourcing, Ghani et al. 
(2013) find evidence of ethnic Indians being more likely to send to work to India when 
outsourcing jobs. These authors also suggest, however, that the Indian diaspora’s role was likely 
modest in the overall rise of India as the top outsourcing destination on oDesk.
12 
To summarize, studies of the United States find a fair amount of evidence that 
immigrants continue to interact with their home countries after coming to the United States. 
These exchanges by themselves are insufficient to conclude that a ―brain gain‖ exists, but they 
are likely a necessary element. More research and modeling (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2011, Docquier 
and Rapoport 2012) is necessary to add this up, which will of course be specific to each country 
and circumstance. 
 
Return Migration 
We close by noting an area where we really wish we knew more: return migration. 
Immigration has always been a temporary step for many, and recent case studies and surveys 
describe the important migration of skilled workers back to home countries (e.g., Saxenian 2006, 
Wadhwa et al. 2009).
13  At this point, we know that this return migration from the United States 
is happening for a variety of reasons, most notably the increased attractiveness of foreign 
locations on personal and professional levels. Restrictive U.S. immigration policy plays a role, 
but this role is likely secondary to the attractive opportunities seen for many in returning home. 
Given the exceptional importance of immigrants for work in U.S. STEM fields, this trend could 
challenge the United States’ role in technology leadership. Alas, while countries measure inflows 
of people reasonably well, outflows of people are measured very poorly, it at all. For the United 
States, clever data work to further quantify these features would be most welcome. 
                                                 
12 Ottaviano et al. (2013) consider the interactions between low-skilled immigration and outsourcing using 
a trade-in-tasks model. Further work with these types of models and high-skilled immigration would be very useful.  
13 Related work includes Nanda and Khanna (2010) and Hovhannisyan and Keller (2010). Return migration 
among immigrants more broadly is better studied (e.g., Dustmann (1996) and later work) than the high-skilled group 
on which this review focuses. 23 
 
 
5. Conclusions  
The global migration of STEM talent is exceptionally important—and sadly under-
studied compared to this importance. This review, while not intended in this way, has mostly 
progressed from things we have a relatively good handle on for the United States (e.g., the 
quantity and quality of immigrants) to pieces that we have very little insight on (e.g., return 
migration). We hope that future research helps fill-in this portrait and provides us a sharper 
platform for policy advice. We overall conclude, as many others have, that immigration has been 
essential for the United States’ leadership in innovation and entrepreneurship. We also generally 
find evidence of positive impacts of high-skilled diasporas for home countries, recognizing that 
the ledger that can be measured in the United States is incomplete. 
 
 
Appendix: H-1B Visa Program 
This  is  an  abbreviated  description  from  Kerr  and  Lincoln  (2010):  The  H-1B  visa  is  a  temporary 
immigration  category  that  allows  U.S.  employers  to  seek  short-term  help  from  skilled  foreigners  in 
―specialty  occupations.‖  These  occupations  are  defined  as  those  requiring  theoretical  and  practical 
application  of  specialized  knowledge  like  engineering  or  accounting;  virtually  all  successful  H-1B 
applicants  have  a  bachelor's  education  or  higher.  The  visa  is  used  especially  for  STEM-related 
occupations, which account for roughly 60% of successful applications. Approximately 40% and 10% of 
H-1B recipients over 2000-2005 came from India and China, respectively.  Shares for other countries are 
less than 5%. 
The sponsoring firm files the H-1B application and must specify an individual candidate.  The employer-
employee match must therefore be made in advance. Workers are tied to their sponsoring firm, although 
some recent changes have increased visa portability. Firms can petition for permanent residency (i.e., a 
green card) on behalf of the worker. If permanent residency is not obtained, the H-1B worker must leave 
the United States at the end of the visa period for one year before applying again. Firms are also required 
to  pay  the  visa  holder the  higher  of  (1)  the  prevailing  wage  in  the  firm  for  the  position  or  (2)  the 
prevailing wage for the occupation in the area of employment. These restrictions were designed to prevent 
H-1B employers from abusing their relationships with foreign workers and to protect domestic workers. 
Since the Immigration Act of 1990, there has been an annual cap on the number of H-1B visas that can be 
issued. The cap governs new H-1B visa issuances only; renewals for the second three-year term are 
exempt, and the maximum length of stay on an H-1B visa is thus six years. While most aspects of the H-
1B program have remained constant since its inception, the cap has fluctuated significantly and is the 
source of extensive controversy. The original 65,000 cap was not binding in the early 1990s but became 
so by the middle of the decade. Legislation in 1998 and 2000 sharply increased the cap over the next five 
years to 195,000 visas. These short-term increases were allowed to expire during the United States’ high-
tech downturn, when visa demand fell short of the cap. The cap returned to the 65,000 level in 2004 and 
became  binding  again,  despite  being  subsequently  raised  by  20,000  through  an  ―advanced  degree‖ 
exemption. This 65,000+20,000 structure remains today. 24 
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